| /linux-4.1.27/kernel/ |
| D | capability.c | 174 kdata[i].inheritable = pI.cap[i]; in SYSCALL_DEFINE2()
227 kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective; in SYSCALL_DEFINE2() local
253 inheritable.cap[i] = kdata[i].inheritable; in SYSCALL_DEFINE2()
258 inheritable.cap[i] = 0; in SYSCALL_DEFINE2()
264 inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK; in SYSCALL_DEFINE2()
271 &effective, &inheritable, &permitted); in SYSCALL_DEFINE2()
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| D | auditsc.c | 1256 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable); in show_special()
1370 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); in audit_log_exit()
1373 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable); in audit_log_exit()
1376 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); in audit_log_exit()
2319 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; in __audit_log_bprm_fcaps()
2324 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; in __audit_log_bprm_fcaps()
2328 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; in __audit_log_bprm_fcaps()
2346 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; in __audit_log_capset()
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| D | audit.h | 64 kernel_cap_t inheritable; member
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| D | audit.c | 1670 kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable; in audit_log_fcaps()
1701 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable; in audit_copy_fcaps()
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| /linux-4.1.27/security/ |
| D | commoncap.c | 208 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) in cap_capget() argument
216 *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; in cap_capget()
253 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in cap_capset() argument
257 !cap_issubset(*inheritable, in cap_capset()
263 if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable, in cap_capset()
278 new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable; in cap_capset()
356 __u32 inheritable = caps->inheritable.cap[i]; in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps() local
363 (new->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable); in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
426 cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable); in get_vfs_caps_from_disk()
430 cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK; in get_vfs_caps_from_disk()
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| D | security.c | 185 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in security_capget() argument
188 return security_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); in security_capget()
193 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in security_capset() argument
197 effective, inheritable, permitted); in security_capset()
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| /linux-4.1.27/include/uapi/linux/ |
| D | capability.h | 48 __u32 inheritable; member
73 __le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */ member
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| /linux-4.1.27/fs/btrfs/ |
| D | props.c | 35 int inheritable; member
50 .inheritable = 1
316 if (!h->inheritable) in inherit_props()
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| /linux-4.1.27/include/linux/ |
| D | security.h | 81 …get(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *…
84 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1475 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
1479 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1779 kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1783 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2000 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in security_capget() argument
2003 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); in security_capget()
2009 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in security_capset() argument
2012 return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted); in security_capset()
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| D | capability.h | 31 kernel_cap_t inheritable; member
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| /linux-4.1.27/security/apparmor/ |
| D | lsm.c | 117 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) in apparmor_capget() argument
127 *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; in apparmor_capget()
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| /linux-4.1.27/Documentation/security/ |
| D | credentials.txt | 170 Set of inheritable capabilities
182 inheritable set might also be so constrained.
187 The inheritable capabilities are the ones that may get passed across
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| /linux-4.1.27/Documentation/vm/ |
| D | numa_memory_policy.txt | 43 it is inheritable, and indeed is inherited, across both fork()
88 inheritable across exec(). Thus, only NUMA-aware applications may
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| /linux-4.1.27/security/selinux/ |
| D | hooks.c | 2021 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) in selinux_capget() argument
2029 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); in selinux_capget()
2034 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in selinux_capset() argument
2040 effective, inheritable, permitted); in selinux_capset()
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| /linux-4.1.27/Documentation/filesystems/ |
| D | vfs.txt | 1023 VFS mount record to provide inheritable mount parameters. NULL should
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| D | proc.txt | 247 CapInh bitmap of inheritable capabilities
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