1/* 2 * AppArmor security module 3 * 4 * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks. 5 * 6 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE 7 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. 8 * 9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 10 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as 11 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the 12 * License. 13 */ 14 15#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> 16#include <linux/moduleparam.h> 17#include <linux/mm.h> 18#include <linux/mman.h> 19#include <linux/mount.h> 20#include <linux/namei.h> 21#include <linux/ptrace.h> 22#include <linux/ctype.h> 23#include <linux/sysctl.h> 24#include <linux/audit.h> 25#include <linux/user_namespace.h> 26#include <net/sock.h> 27 28#include "include/apparmor.h" 29#include "include/apparmorfs.h" 30#include "include/audit.h" 31#include "include/capability.h" 32#include "include/context.h" 33#include "include/file.h" 34#include "include/ipc.h" 35#include "include/path.h" 36#include "include/policy.h" 37#include "include/procattr.h" 38 39/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */ 40int apparmor_initialized __initdata; 41 42/* 43 * LSM hook functions 44 */ 45 46/* 47 * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles 48 */ 49static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) 50{ 51 aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred)); 52 cred_cxt(cred) = NULL; 53} 54 55/* 56 * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials 57 */ 58static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 59{ 60 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */ 61 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp); 62 if (!cxt) 63 return -ENOMEM; 64 65 cred_cxt(cred) = cxt; 66 return 0; 67} 68 69/* 70 * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block 71 */ 72static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 73 gfp_t gfp) 74{ 75 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */ 76 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp); 77 if (!cxt) 78 return -ENOMEM; 79 80 aa_dup_task_context(cxt, cred_cxt(old)); 81 cred_cxt(new) = cxt; 82 return 0; 83} 84 85/* 86 * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds 87 */ 88static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 89{ 90 const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = cred_cxt(old); 91 struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(new); 92 93 aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt); 94} 95 96static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, 97 unsigned int mode) 98{ 99 return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode); 100} 101 102static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) 103{ 104 return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); 105} 106 107/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */ 108static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, 109 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) 110{ 111 struct aa_profile *profile; 112 const struct cred *cred; 113 114 rcu_read_lock(); 115 cred = __task_cred(target); 116 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); 117 118 /* 119 * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will 120 * initialize effective and permitted. 121 */ 122 if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) { 123 *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow); 124 *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow); 125 } 126 rcu_read_unlock(); 127 128 return 0; 129} 130 131static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, 132 int cap, int audit) 133{ 134 struct aa_profile *profile; 135 int error = 0; 136 137 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); 138 if (!unconfined(profile)) 139 error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit); 140 return error; 141} 142 143/** 144 * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths 145 * @op: operation being checked 146 * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL) 147 * @mask: requested permissions mask 148 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) 149 * 150 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied 151 */ 152static int common_perm(int op, struct path *path, u32 mask, 153 struct path_cond *cond) 154{ 155 struct aa_profile *profile; 156 int error = 0; 157 158 profile = __aa_current_profile(); 159 if (!unconfined(profile)) 160 error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond); 161 162 return error; 163} 164 165/** 166 * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry 167 * @op: operation being checked 168 * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL) 169 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) 170 * @mask: requested permissions mask 171 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) 172 * 173 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied 174 */ 175static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, struct path *dir, 176 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, 177 struct path_cond *cond) 178{ 179 struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry }; 180 181 return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond); 182} 183 184/** 185 * common_perm_mnt_dentry - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry 186 * @op: operation being checked 187 * @mnt: mount point of dentry (NOT NULL) 188 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) 189 * @mask: requested permissions mask 190 * 191 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied 192 */ 193static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt, 194 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) 195{ 196 struct path path = { mnt, dentry }; 197 struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_uid, 198 d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_mode 199 }; 200 201 return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond); 202} 203 204/** 205 * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm 206 * @op: operation being checked 207 * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL) 208 * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL) 209 * @mask: requested permission mask 210 * 211 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied 212 */ 213static int common_perm_rm(int op, struct path *dir, 214 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) 215{ 216 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); 217 struct path_cond cond = { }; 218 219 if (!inode || !dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dentry)) 220 return 0; 221 222 cond.uid = inode->i_uid; 223 cond.mode = inode->i_mode; 224 225 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); 226} 227 228/** 229 * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create 230 * @op: operation being checked 231 * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL) 232 * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL) 233 * @mask: request permission mask 234 * @mode: created file mode 235 * 236 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied 237 */ 238static int common_perm_create(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 239 u32 mask, umode_t mode) 240{ 241 struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode }; 242 243 if (!dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry)) 244 return 0; 245 246 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); 247} 248 249static int apparmor_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 250{ 251 return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); 252} 253 254static int apparmor_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 255 umode_t mode) 256{ 257 return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, 258 S_IFDIR); 259} 260 261static int apparmor_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 262{ 263 return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); 264} 265 266static int apparmor_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 267 umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) 268{ 269 return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode); 270} 271 272static int apparmor_path_truncate(struct path *path) 273{ 274 struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid, 275 d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode 276 }; 277 278 if (!path->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(path->dentry)) 279 return 0; 280 281 return common_perm(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE, 282 &cond); 283} 284 285static int apparmor_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 286 const char *old_name) 287{ 288 return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, 289 S_IFLNK); 290} 291 292static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, 293 struct dentry *new_dentry) 294{ 295 struct aa_profile *profile; 296 int error = 0; 297 298 if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry)) 299 return 0; 300 301 profile = aa_current_profile(); 302 if (!unconfined(profile)) 303 error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); 304 return error; 305} 306 307static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 308 struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) 309{ 310 struct aa_profile *profile; 311 int error = 0; 312 313 if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry)) 314 return 0; 315 316 profile = aa_current_profile(); 317 if (!unconfined(profile)) { 318 struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry }; 319 struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry }; 320 struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid, 321 d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode 322 }; 323 324 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0, 325 MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE | 326 AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE, 327 &cond); 328 if (!error) 329 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path, 330 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | 331 AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond); 332 333 } 334 return error; 335} 336 337static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode) 338{ 339 if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry)) 340 return 0; 341 342 return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, path->mnt, path->dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD); 343} 344 345static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) 346{ 347 struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid, 348 d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode 349 }; 350 351 if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry)) 352 return 0; 353 354 return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond); 355} 356 357static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) 358{ 359 if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry)) 360 return 0; 361 362 return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_GETATTR, path->mnt, path->dentry, 363 AA_MAY_META_READ); 364} 365 366static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) 367{ 368 struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security; 369 struct aa_profile *profile; 370 int error = 0; 371 372 if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry)) 373 return 0; 374 375 /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks. 376 * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with 377 * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to 378 * actually execute the image. 379 */ 380 if (current->in_execve) { 381 fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP; 382 return 0; 383 } 384 385 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); 386 if (!unconfined(profile)) { 387 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); 388 struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode }; 389 390 error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0, 391 aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond); 392 /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */ 393 fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file); 394 } 395 396 return error; 397} 398 399static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) 400{ 401 /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */ 402 file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL); 403 if (!file->f_security) 404 return -ENOMEM; 405 return 0; 406 407} 408 409static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file) 410{ 411 struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security; 412 413 aa_free_file_context(cxt); 414} 415 416static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask) 417{ 418 struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security; 419 struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred); 420 int error = 0; 421 422 BUG_ON(!fprofile); 423 424 if (!file->f_path.mnt || 425 !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry)) 426 return 0; 427 428 profile = __aa_current_profile(); 429 430 /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred 431 * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than 432 * was granted. 433 * 434 * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file 435 * delegation from unconfined tasks 436 */ 437 if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) && 438 ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow))) 439 error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask); 440 441 return error; 442} 443 444static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) 445{ 446 return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask); 447} 448 449static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) 450{ 451 u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK; 452 453 if (cmd == F_WRLCK) 454 mask |= MAY_WRITE; 455 456 return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask); 457} 458 459static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot, 460 unsigned long flags) 461{ 462 int mask = 0; 463 464 if (!file || !file->f_security) 465 return 0; 466 467 if (prot & PROT_READ) 468 mask |= MAY_READ; 469 /* 470 * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't 471 * write back to the files 472 */ 473 if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE)) 474 mask |= MAY_WRITE; 475 if (prot & PROT_EXEC) 476 mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP; 477 478 return common_file_perm(op, file, mask); 479} 480 481static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, 482 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) 483{ 484 return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags); 485} 486 487static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, 488 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) 489{ 490 return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot, 491 !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0); 492} 493 494static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, 495 char **value) 496{ 497 int error = -ENOENT; 498 /* released below */ 499 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); 500 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred); 501 struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; 502 503 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) 504 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile); 505 else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous) 506 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->previous); 507 else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec) 508 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec); 509 else 510 error = -EINVAL; 511 512 if (profile) 513 error = aa_getprocattr(profile, value); 514 515 aa_put_profile(profile); 516 put_cred(cred); 517 518 return error; 519} 520 521static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, 522 void *value, size_t size) 523{ 524 struct common_audit_data sa; 525 struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; 526 char *command, *args = value; 527 size_t arg_size; 528 int error; 529 530 if (size == 0) 531 return -EINVAL; 532 /* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that 533 * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1 534 * so that AppArmor can null terminate them 535 */ 536 if (args[size - 1] != '\0') { 537 if (size == PAGE_SIZE) 538 return -EINVAL; 539 args[size] = '\0'; 540 } 541 542 /* task can only write its own attributes */ 543 if (current != task) 544 return -EACCES; 545 546 args = value; 547 args = strim(args); 548 command = strsep(&args, " "); 549 if (!args) 550 return -EINVAL; 551 args = skip_spaces(args); 552 if (!*args) 553 return -EINVAL; 554 555 arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value); 556 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) { 557 if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) { 558 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, 559 !AA_DO_TEST); 560 } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) { 561 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, 562 AA_DO_TEST); 563 } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) { 564 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC, 565 !AA_DO_TEST); 566 } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) { 567 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC, 568 AA_DO_TEST); 569 } else 570 goto fail; 571 } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) { 572 if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0) 573 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC, 574 !AA_DO_TEST); 575 else 576 goto fail; 577 } else 578 /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */ 579 return -EINVAL; 580 581 if (!error) 582 error = size; 583 return error; 584 585fail: 586 sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; 587 sa.aad = &aad; 588 aad.profile = aa_current_profile(); 589 aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR; 590 aad.info = name; 591 aad.error = -EINVAL; 592 aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL); 593 return -EINVAL; 594} 595 596static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, 597 unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) 598{ 599 struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile(); 600 int error = 0; 601 602 if (!unconfined(profile)) 603 error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, task, resource, new_rlim); 604 605 return error; 606} 607 608static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = { 609 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check), 610 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme), 611 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget), 612 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable), 613 614 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link), 615 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink), 616 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink), 617 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir), 618 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir), 619 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod), 620 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename), 621 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod), 622 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown), 623 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate), 624 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr), 625 626 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open), 627 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission), 628 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security), 629 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security), 630 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file), 631 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect), 632 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock), 633 634 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr), 635 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), 636 637 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank), 638 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free), 639 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare), 640 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer), 641 642 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds), 643 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds), 644 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds), 645 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec), 646 647 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), 648}; 649 650/* 651 * AppArmor sysfs module parameters 652 */ 653 654static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); 655static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); 656#define param_check_aabool param_check_bool 657static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = { 658 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG, 659 .set = param_set_aabool, 660 .get = param_get_aabool 661}; 662 663static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); 664static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); 665#define param_check_aauint param_check_uint 666static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = { 667 .set = param_set_aauint, 668 .get = param_get_aauint 669}; 670 671static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); 672static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); 673#define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool 674static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = { 675 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG, 676 .set = param_set_aalockpolicy, 677 .get = param_get_aalockpolicy 678}; 679 680static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); 681static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); 682 683static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); 684static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); 685 686/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters 687 * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation. 688 */ 689 690/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */ 691enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE; 692module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode, 693 &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 694 695/* Debug mode */ 696bool aa_g_debug; 697module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 698 699/* Audit mode */ 700enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; 701module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, 702 &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 703 704/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This 705 * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running 706 */ 707bool aa_g_audit_header = 1; 708module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, 709 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 710 711/* lock out loading/removal of policy 712 * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to 713 * load policy, if lock_policy is set 714 */ 715bool aa_g_lock_policy; 716module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, 717 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 718 719/* Syscall logging mode */ 720bool aa_g_logsyscall; 721module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 722 723/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */ 724unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX; 725module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 726 727/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification 728 * on the loaded policy is done. 729 */ 730bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1; 731module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, 732 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 733 734/* Boot time disable flag */ 735static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; 736module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO); 737 738static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) 739{ 740 unsigned long enabled; 741 int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled); 742 if (!error) 743 apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; 744 return 1; 745} 746 747__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup); 748 749/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */ 750static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 751{ 752 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) 753 return -EPERM; 754 if (aa_g_lock_policy) 755 return -EACCES; 756 return param_set_bool(val, kp); 757} 758 759static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 760{ 761 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) 762 return -EPERM; 763 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); 764} 765 766static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 767{ 768 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) 769 return -EPERM; 770 return param_set_bool(val, kp); 771} 772 773static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 774{ 775 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) 776 return -EPERM; 777 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); 778} 779 780static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 781{ 782 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) 783 return -EPERM; 784 return param_set_uint(val, kp); 785} 786 787static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 788{ 789 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) 790 return -EPERM; 791 return param_get_uint(buffer, kp); 792} 793 794static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) 795{ 796 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) 797 return -EPERM; 798 799 if (!apparmor_enabled) 800 return -EINVAL; 801 802 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]); 803} 804 805static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) 806{ 807 int i; 808 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) 809 return -EPERM; 810 811 if (!apparmor_enabled) 812 return -EINVAL; 813 814 if (!val) 815 return -EINVAL; 816 817 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) { 818 if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) { 819 aa_g_audit = i; 820 return 0; 821 } 822 } 823 824 return -EINVAL; 825} 826 827static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) 828{ 829 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) 830 return -EPERM; 831 832 if (!apparmor_enabled) 833 return -EINVAL; 834 835 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]); 836} 837 838static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) 839{ 840 int i; 841 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) 842 return -EPERM; 843 844 if (!apparmor_enabled) 845 return -EINVAL; 846 847 if (!val) 848 return -EINVAL; 849 850 for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) { 851 if (strcmp(val, aa_profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) { 852 aa_g_profile_mode = i; 853 return 0; 854 } 855 } 856 857 return -EINVAL; 858} 859 860/* 861 * AppArmor init functions 862 */ 863 864/** 865 * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task. 866 * 867 * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined 868 */ 869static int __init set_init_cxt(void) 870{ 871 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred; 872 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; 873 874 cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL); 875 if (!cxt) 876 return -ENOMEM; 877 878 cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined); 879 cred_cxt(cred) = cxt; 880 881 return 0; 882} 883 884static int __init apparmor_init(void) 885{ 886 int error; 887 888 if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) { 889 aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter"); 890 apparmor_enabled = 0; 891 return 0; 892 } 893 894 error = aa_alloc_root_ns(); 895 if (error) { 896 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n"); 897 goto alloc_out; 898 } 899 900 error = set_init_cxt(); 901 if (error) { 902 AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n"); 903 aa_free_root_ns(); 904 goto alloc_out; 905 } 906 security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks)); 907 908 /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ 909 apparmor_initialized = 1; 910 if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) 911 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled"); 912 else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) 913 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled"); 914 else 915 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized"); 916 917 return error; 918 919alloc_out: 920 aa_destroy_aafs(); 921 922 apparmor_enabled = 0; 923 return error; 924} 925 926security_initcall(apparmor_init); 927