| /linux-4.4.14/fs/ecryptfs/ |
| D | debug.c | 34 char salt[ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE * 2 + 1]; in ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok() local
43 ecryptfs_to_hex(salt, auth_tok->token.password.salt, in ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok()
45 salt[ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE * 2] = '\0'; in ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok()
46 ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * salt = [%s]\n", salt); in ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok()
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| D | keystore.c | 1482 memcpy((*new_auth_tok)->token.password.salt, in parse_tag_3_packet()
2357 memcpy(&dest[(*packet_size)], auth_tok->token.password.salt, in write_tag_3_packet()
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| /linux-4.4.14/drivers/crypto/caam/ |
| D | pdb.h | 68 u32 salt; /* lower 24 bits */ member
76 u32 salt; /* lower 24 bits */ member
105 u32 salt; member
110 u32 salt; member
117 u32 salt; member
329 u16 salt[7]; member
344 u16 salt[7]; member
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| /linux-4.4.14/Documentation/device-mapper/ |
| D | verity.txt | 13 <algorithm> <digest> <salt>
20 The salt is appended when hashing, digests are stored continuously and
24 The salt is prepended when hashing and each digest is
60 and the salt. This hash should be trusted as there is no other authenticity
63 <salt>
64 The hexadecimal encoding of the salt value.
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| /linux-4.4.14/drivers/md/ |
| D | dm-verity.c | 60 u8 *salt; /* salt: its size is salt_size */ member
294 r = crypto_shash_update(desc, v->salt, v->salt_size); in verity_verify_level()
308 r = crypto_shash_update(desc, v->salt, v->salt_size); in verity_verify_level()
395 r = crypto_shash_update(desc, v->salt, v->salt_size); in verity_verify_io()
424 r = crypto_shash_update(desc, v->salt, v->salt_size); in verity_verify_io()
616 DMEMIT("%02x", v->salt[x]); in verity_status()
678 kfree(v->salt); in verity_dtr()
847 v->salt = kmalloc(v->salt_size, GFP_KERNEL); in verity_ctr()
848 if (!v->salt) { in verity_ctr()
854 hex2bin(v->salt, argv[9], v->salt_size)) { in verity_ctr()
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| D | dm-crypt.c | 90 u8 *salt; member
275 err = crypto_hash_digest(&desc, &sg, cc->key_size, essiv->salt); in crypt_iv_essiv_init()
281 err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt, in crypt_iv_essiv_init()
297 memset(essiv->salt, 0, salt_size); in crypt_iv_essiv_wipe()
300 r = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt, salt_size); in crypt_iv_essiv_wipe()
310 u8 *salt, unsigned saltsize) in setup_essiv_cpu() argument
330 err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, salt, saltsize); in setup_essiv_cpu()
348 kzfree(essiv->salt); in crypt_iv_essiv_dtr()
349 essiv->salt = NULL; in crypt_iv_essiv_dtr()
364 u8 *salt = NULL; in crypt_iv_essiv_ctr() local
[all …]
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| /linux-4.4.14/crypto/ |
| D | eseqiv.c | 39 char salt[]; member
128 memcpy(req->creq.info, ctx->salt, ivsize); in eseqiv_givencrypt()
182 err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, ctx->salt, in eseqiv_init()
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| D | seqiv.c | 30 u8 salt[] __attribute__ ((aligned(__alignof__(u32)))); member
99 crypto_xor(info, ctx->salt, ivsize); in seqiv_geniv()
196 crypto_xor(info, ctx->salt, ivsize); in seqiv_aead_encrypt()
245 err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, ctx->salt, in seqiv_init()
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| D | chacha20poly1305.c | 38 u8 salt[]; member
92 memcpy(iv + sizeof(leicb), ctx->salt, ctx->saltlen); in chacha_iv()
493 memcpy(ctx->salt, key + keylen, ctx->saltlen); in chachapoly_setkey()
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| D | echainiv.c | 142 crypto_xor(info, ctx->salt, ivsize); in echainiv_encrypt()
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| D | aead.c | 291 err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, ctx->salt, in aead_init_geniv()
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| D | Kconfig | 269 xoring it with a salt. This algorithm is mainly useful for CTR
279 a sequence number xored with a salt. This is the default
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| /linux-4.4.14/include/crypto/internal/ |
| D | geniv.h | 24 u8 salt[] __attribute__ ((aligned(__alignof__(u32)))); member
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| /linux-4.4.14/Documentation/filesystems/ |
| D | ecryptfs.txt | 44 You should be prompted for a passphrase and a salt (the salt may be
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| /linux-4.4.14/net/sched/ |
| D | sch_sfb.c | 256 int *qerr, u32 *salt) in sfb_classify() argument
272 *salt = TC_H_MIN(res.classid); in sfb_classify()
311 u32 salt; in sfb_enqueue() local
314 if (!sfb_classify(skb, fl, &ret, &salt)) in sfb_enqueue()
316 sfbhash = jhash_1word(salt, q->bins[slot].perturbation); in sfb_enqueue()
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| D | cls_rsvp.h | 382 static unsigned int gen_handle(struct tcf_proto *tp, unsigned salt) in gen_handle() argument
392 h = data->hgenerator|salt; in gen_handle()
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| /linux-4.4.14/include/linux/ |
| D | ecryptfs.h | 78 u8 salt[ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE]; member
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| /linux-4.4.14/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/ |
| D | gss_krb5_crypto.c | 128 arcfour_hmac_md5_usage_to_salt(unsigned int usage, u8 salt[4]) in arcfour_hmac_md5_usage_to_salt()
142 salt[0] = (ms_usage >> 0) & 0xff; in arcfour_hmac_md5_usage_to_salt()
143 salt[1] = (ms_usage >> 8) & 0xff; in arcfour_hmac_md5_usage_to_salt()
144 salt[2] = (ms_usage >> 16) & 0xff; in arcfour_hmac_md5_usage_to_salt()
145 salt[3] = (ms_usage >> 24) & 0xff; in arcfour_hmac_md5_usage_to_salt()
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| /linux-4.4.14/drivers/gpu/drm/ |
| D | drm_dp_mst_topology.c | 1333 u64 salt = get_jiffies_64(); in drm_dp_validate_guid() local
1334 memcpy(&guid[0], &salt, sizeof(u64)); in drm_dp_validate_guid()
1335 memcpy(&guid[8], &salt, sizeof(u64)); in drm_dp_validate_guid()
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| /linux-4.4.14/drivers/crypto/ |
| D | ixp4xx_crypto.c | 186 u8 salt[MAX_IVLEN]; member
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| /linux-4.4.14/net/bluetooth/ |
| D | smp.c | 257 const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60, in smp_f5() local
267 err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t); in smp_f5()
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| /linux-4.4.14/Documentation/ |
| D | edac.txt | 53 The presence of PCI Parity errors must be examined with a grain of salt.
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| /linux-4.4.14/Documentation/sound/oss/ |
| D | README.OSS | 16 they are gone forever. Keeping this in mind and with a grain of salt this
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