/linux-4.4.14/kernel/ |
D | capability.c | 174 kdata[i].inheritable = pI.cap[i]; in SYSCALL_DEFINE2() 227 kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective; in SYSCALL_DEFINE2() local 253 inheritable.cap[i] = kdata[i].inheritable; in SYSCALL_DEFINE2() 258 inheritable.cap[i] = 0; in SYSCALL_DEFINE2() 264 inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK; in SYSCALL_DEFINE2() 271 &effective, &inheritable, &permitted); in SYSCALL_DEFINE2()
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D | auditsc.c | 1256 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable); in show_special() 1370 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); in audit_log_exit() 1373 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable); in audit_log_exit() 1376 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); in audit_log_exit() 2319 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; in __audit_log_bprm_fcaps() 2324 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; in __audit_log_bprm_fcaps() 2328 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; in __audit_log_bprm_fcaps() 2346 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; in __audit_log_capset()
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D | audit.h | 65 kernel_cap_t inheritable; member
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D | audit.c | 1684 kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable; in audit_log_fcaps() 1715 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable; in audit_copy_fcaps()
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/linux-4.4.14/security/ |
D | commoncap.c | 203 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) in cap_capget() argument 211 *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; in cap_capget() 248 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in cap_capset() argument 252 !cap_issubset(*inheritable, in cap_capset() 258 if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable, in cap_capset() 273 new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable; in cap_capset() 282 *inheritable)); in cap_capset() 361 __u32 inheritable = caps->inheritable.cap[i]; in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps() local 369 (new->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable); in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps() 432 cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable); in get_vfs_caps_from_disk() [all …]
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D | security.c | 168 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in security_capget() argument 172 effective, inheritable, permitted); in security_capget() 177 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in security_capset() argument 181 effective, inheritable, permitted); in security_capset()
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/linux-4.4.14/include/uapi/linux/ |
D | capability.h | 48 __u32 inheritable; member 73 __le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */ member
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/linux-4.4.14/fs/btrfs/ |
D | props.c | 35 int inheritable; member 50 .inheritable = 1 315 if (!h->inheritable) in inherit_props()
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/linux-4.4.14/include/linux/ |
D | security.h | 75 …get(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *… 78 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 196 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 200 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, 418 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in security_capget() argument 421 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); in security_capget() 427 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in security_capset() argument 430 return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted); in security_capset()
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D | capability.h | 31 kernel_cap_t inheritable; member
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D | lsm_hooks.h | 1317 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted); 1320 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
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/linux-4.4.14/Documentation/security/ |
D | credentials.txt | 170 Set of inheritable capabilities 182 inheritable set might also be so constrained. 187 The inheritable capabilities are the ones that may get passed across
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/linux-4.4.14/security/apparmor/ |
D | lsm.c | 109 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) in apparmor_capget() argument
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/linux-4.4.14/Documentation/vm/ |
D | numa_memory_policy.txt | 43 it is inheritable, and indeed is inherited, across both fork() 88 inheritable across exec(). Thus, only NUMA-aware applications may
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/linux-4.4.14/security/selinux/ |
D | hooks.c | 2056 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) in selinux_capget() argument 2063 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, in selinux_capset() argument
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/linux-4.4.14/Documentation/filesystems/ |
D | vfs.txt | 1030 VFS mount record to provide inheritable mount parameters. NULL should
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D | proc.txt | 250 CapInh bitmap of inheritable capabilities
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