security/apparmor/lsm.c

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This source file includes following definitions.
apparmor_cred_free
apparmor_cred_alloc_blank
apparmor_cred_prepare
apparmor_cred_transfer
apparmor_task_free
apparmor_task_alloc
apparmor_ptrace_access_check
apparmor_ptrace_traceme
apparmor_capget
apparmor_capable
common_perm
common_perm_cond
common_perm_dir_dentry
common_perm_rm
common_perm_create
apparmor_path_unlink
apparmor_path_mkdir
apparmor_path_rmdir
apparmor_path_mknod
apparmor_path_truncate
apparmor_path_symlink
apparmor_path_link
apparmor_path_rename
apparmor_path_chmod
apparmor_path_chown
apparmor_inode_getattr
apparmor_file_open
apparmor_file_alloc_security
apparmor_file_free_security
common_file_perm
apparmor_file_receive
apparmor_file_permission
apparmor_file_lock
common_mmap
apparmor_mmap_file
apparmor_file_mprotect
apparmor_sb_mount
apparmor_sb_umount
apparmor_sb_pivotroot
apparmor_getprocattr
apparmor_setprocattr
apparmor_bprm_committing_creds
apparmor_bprm_committed_creds
apparmor_task_getsecid
apparmor_task_setrlimit
apparmor_task_kill
apparmor_sk_alloc_security
apparmor_sk_free_security
apparmor_sk_clone_security
apparmor_socket_create
apparmor_socket_post_create
apparmor_socket_bind
apparmor_socket_connect
apparmor_socket_listen
apparmor_socket_accept
aa_sock_msg_perm
apparmor_socket_sendmsg
apparmor_socket_recvmsg
aa_sock_perm
apparmor_socket_getsockname
apparmor_socket_getpeername
aa_sock_opt_perm
apparmor_socket_getsockopt
apparmor_socket_setsockopt
apparmor_socket_shutdown
apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb
sk_peer_label
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram
apparmor_sock_graft
apparmor_inet_conn_request
apparmor_enabled_setup
param_set_aalockpolicy
param_get_aalockpolicy
param_set_aabool
param_get_aabool
param_set_aauint
param_get_aauint
param_set_aaintbool
param_get_aaintbool
param_get_audit
param_set_audit
param_get_mode
param_set_mode
set_init_ctx
destroy_buffers
alloc_buffers
apparmor_dointvec
apparmor_init_sysctl
apparmor_init_sysctl
apparmor_ip_postroute
apparmor_ipv4_postroute
apparmor_ipv6_postroute
apparmor_nf_register
apparmor_nf_unregister
apparmor_nf_ip_init
apparmor_init
   1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
   2 /*
   3  * AppArmor security module
   4  *
   5  * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
   6  *
   7  * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
   8  * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
   9  */
  10 
  11 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
  12 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
  13 #include <linux/mm.h>
  14 #include <linux/mman.h>
  15 #include <linux/mount.h>
  16 #include <linux/namei.h>
  17 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
  18 #include <linux/ctype.h>
  19 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
  20 #include <linux/audit.h>
  21 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
  22 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
  23 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
  24 #include <net/sock.h>
  25 #include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
  26 
  27 #include "include/apparmor.h"
  28 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
  29 #include "include/audit.h"
  30 #include "include/capability.h"
  31 #include "include/cred.h"
  32 #include "include/file.h"
  33 #include "include/ipc.h"
  34 #include "include/net.h"
  35 #include "include/path.h"
  36 #include "include/label.h"
  37 #include "include/policy.h"
  38 #include "include/policy_ns.h"
  39 #include "include/procattr.h"
  40 #include "include/mount.h"
  41 #include "include/secid.h"
  42 
  43 /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
  44 int apparmor_initialized;
  45 
  46 DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers);
  47 
  48 
  49 /*
  50  * LSM hook functions
  51  */
  52 
  53 /*
  54  * put the associated labels
  55  */
  56 static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
  57 {
  58         aa_put_label(cred_label(cred));
  59         set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
  60 }
  61 
  62 /*
  63  * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
  64  */
  65 static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
  66 {
  67         set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
  68         return 0;
  69 }
  70 
  71 /*
  72  * prepare new cred label for modification by prepare_cred block
  73  */
  74 static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
  75                                  gfp_t gfp)
  76 {
  77         set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)));
  78         return 0;
  79 }
  80 
  81 /*
  82  * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
  83  */
  84 static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
  85 {
  86         set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)));
  87 }
  88 
  89 static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
  90 {
  91 
  92         aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task));
  93 }
  94 
  95 static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
  96                                unsigned long clone_flags)
  97 {
  98         struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task);
  99 
 100         aa_dup_task_ctx(new, task_ctx(current));
 101 
 102         return 0;
 103 }
 104 
 105 static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 106                                         unsigned int mode)
 107 {
 108         struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
 109         int error;
 110 
 111         tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
 112         tracee = aa_get_task_label(child);
 113         error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee,
 114                         (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ
 115                                                   : AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
 116         aa_put_label(tracee);
 117         __end_current_label_crit_section(tracer);
 118 
 119         return error;
 120 }
 121 
 122 static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 123 {
 124         struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
 125         int error;
 126 
 127         tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
 128         tracer = aa_get_task_label(parent);
 129         error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
 130         aa_put_label(tracer);
 131         __end_current_label_crit_section(tracee);
 132 
 133         return error;
 134 }
 135 
 136 /* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
 137 static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 138                            kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 139 {
 140         struct aa_label *label;
 141         const struct cred *cred;
 142 
 143         rcu_read_lock();
 144         cred = __task_cred(target);
 145         label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
 146 
 147         /*
 148          * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
 149          * initialize effective and permitted.
 150          */
 151         if (!unconfined(label)) {
 152                 struct aa_profile *profile;
 153                 struct label_it i;
 154 
 155                 label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) {
 156                         if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
 157                                 continue;
 158                         *effective = cap_intersect(*effective,
 159                                                    profile->caps.allow);
 160                         *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted,
 161                                                    profile->caps.allow);
 162                 }
 163         }
 164         rcu_read_unlock();
 165         aa_put_label(label);
 166 
 167         return 0;
 168 }
 169 
 170 static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
 171                             int cap, unsigned int opts)
 172 {
 173         struct aa_label *label;
 174         int error = 0;
 175 
 176         label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
 177         if (!unconfined(label))
 178                 error = aa_capable(label, cap, opts);
 179         aa_put_label(label);
 180 
 181         return error;
 182 }
 183 
 184 /**
 185  * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
 186  * @op: operation being checked
 187  * @path: path to check permission of  (NOT NULL)
 188  * @mask: requested permissions mask
 189  * @cond: conditional info for the permission request  (NOT NULL)
 190  *
 191  * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
 192  */
 193 static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
 194                        struct path_cond *cond)
 195 {
 196         struct aa_label *label;
 197         int error = 0;
 198 
 199         label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
 200         if (!unconfined(label))
 201                 error = aa_path_perm(op, label, path, 0, mask, cond);
 202         __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 203 
 204         return error;
 205 }
 206 
 207 /**
 208  * common_perm_cond - common permission wrapper around inode cond
 209  * @op: operation being checked
 210  * @path: location to check (NOT NULL)
 211  * @mask: requested permissions mask
 212  *
 213  * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
 214  */
 215 static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
 216 {
 217         struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid,
 218                                   d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
 219         };
 220 
 221         if (!path_mediated_fs(path->dentry))
 222                 return 0;
 223 
 224         return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond);
 225 }
 226 
 227 /**
 228  * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
 229  * @op: operation being checked
 230  * @dir: directory of the dentry  (NOT NULL)
 231  * @dentry: dentry to check  (NOT NULL)
 232  * @mask: requested permissions mask
 233  * @cond: conditional info for the permission request  (NOT NULL)
 234  *
 235  * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
 236  */
 237 static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
 238                                   struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
 239                                   struct path_cond *cond)
 240 {
 241         struct path path = { .mnt = dir->mnt, .dentry = dentry };
 242 
 243         return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
 244 }
 245 
 246 /**
 247  * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
 248  * @op: operation being checked
 249  * @dir: directory that the dentry is in  (NOT NULL)
 250  * @dentry: dentry being rm'd  (NOT NULL)
 251  * @mask: requested permission mask
 252  *
 253  * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
 254  */
 255 static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
 256                           struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
 257 {
 258         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 259         struct path_cond cond = { };
 260 
 261         if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry))
 262                 return 0;
 263 
 264         cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
 265         cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
 266 
 267         return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
 268 }
 269 
 270 /**
 271  * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
 272  * @op: operation being checked
 273  * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in  (NOT NULL)
 274  * @dentry: dentry to create   (NOT NULL)
 275  * @mask: request permission mask
 276  * @mode: created file mode
 277  *
 278  * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
 279  */
 280 static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
 281                               struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode)
 282 {
 283         struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
 284 
 285         if (!path_mediated_fs(dir->dentry))
 286                 return 0;
 287 
 288         return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
 289 }
 290 
 291 static int apparmor_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 292 {
 293         return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
 294 }
 295 
 296 static int apparmor_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 297                                umode_t mode)
 298 {
 299         return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
 300                                   S_IFDIR);
 301 }
 302 
 303 static int apparmor_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 304 {
 305         return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
 306 }
 307 
 308 static int apparmor_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 309                                umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
 310 {
 311         return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
 312 }
 313 
 314 static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
 315 {
 316         return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR);
 317 }
 318 
 319 static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 320                                  const char *old_name)
 321 {
 322         return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
 323                                   S_IFLNK);
 324 }
 325 
 326 static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
 327                               struct dentry *new_dentry)
 328 {
 329         struct aa_label *label;
 330         int error = 0;
 331 
 332         if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
 333                 return 0;
 334 
 335         label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
 336         if (!unconfined(label))
 337                 error = aa_path_link(label, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
 338         end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 339 
 340         return error;
 341 }
 342 
 343 static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 344                                 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
 345 {
 346         struct aa_label *label;
 347         int error = 0;
 348 
 349         if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
 350                 return 0;
 351 
 352         label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
 353         if (!unconfined(label)) {
 354                 struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt,
 355                                          .dentry = old_dentry };
 356                 struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt,
 357                                          .dentry = new_dentry };
 358                 struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid,
 359                                           d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
 360                 };
 361 
 362                 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &old_path, 0,
 363                                      MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
 364                                      AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
 365                                      &cond);
 366                 if (!error)
 367                         error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, label, &new_path,
 368                                              0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
 369                                              AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
 370 
 371         }
 372         end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 373 
 374         return error;
 375 }
 376 
 377 static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
 378 {
 379         return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
 380 }
 381 
 382 static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
 383 {
 384         return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN);
 385 }
 386 
 387 static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
 388 {
 389         return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR);
 390 }
 391 
 392 static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file)
 393 {
 394         struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file);
 395         struct aa_label *label;
 396         int error = 0;
 397 
 398         if (!path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
 399                 return 0;
 400 
 401         /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
 402          * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
 403          * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
 404          * actually execute the image.
 405          */
 406         if (current->in_execve) {
 407                 fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
 408                 return 0;
 409         }
 410 
 411         label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(file->f_cred);
 412         if (!unconfined(label)) {
 413                 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 414                 struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
 415 
 416                 error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, label, &file->f_path, 0,
 417                                      aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
 418                 /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
 419                 fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
 420         }
 421         aa_put_label(label);
 422 
 423         return error;
 424 }
 425 
 426 static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 427 {
 428         struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);
 429         struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
 430 
 431         spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
 432         rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
 433         end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 434         return 0;
 435 }
 436 
 437 static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
 438 {
 439         struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);
 440 
 441         if (ctx)
 442                 aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label));
 443 }
 444 
 445 static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
 446 {
 447         struct aa_label *label;
 448         int error = 0;
 449 
 450         /* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */
 451         if (file->f_path.dentry == aa_null.dentry)
 452                 return -EACCES;
 453 
 454         label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
 455         error = aa_file_perm(op, label, file, mask);
 456         __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 457 
 458         return error;
 459 }
 460 
 461 static int apparmor_file_receive(struct file *file)
 462 {
 463         return common_file_perm(OP_FRECEIVE, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file));
 464 }
 465 
 466 static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 467 {
 468         return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
 469 }
 470 
 471 static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 472 {
 473         u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
 474 
 475         if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
 476                 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
 477 
 478         return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
 479 }
 480 
 481 static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 482                        unsigned long flags)
 483 {
 484         int mask = 0;
 485 
 486         if (!file || !file_ctx(file))
 487                 return 0;
 488 
 489         if (prot & PROT_READ)
 490                 mask |= MAY_READ;
 491         /*
 492          * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
 493          * write back to the files
 494          */
 495         if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
 496                 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
 497         if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
 498                 mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
 499 
 500         return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
 501 }
 502 
 503 static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 504                               unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 505 {
 506         return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
 507 }
 508 
 509 static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 510                                   unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
 511 {
 512         return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
 513                            !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
 514 }
 515 
 516 static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
 517                              const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
 518 {
 519         struct aa_label *label;
 520         int error = 0;
 521 
 522         /* Discard magic */
 523         if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
 524                 flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
 525 
 526         flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
 527 
 528         label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
 529         if (!unconfined(label)) {
 530                 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
 531                         error = aa_remount(label, path, flags, data);
 532                 else if (flags & MS_BIND)
 533                         error = aa_bind_mount(label, path, dev_name, flags);
 534                 else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
 535                                   MS_UNBINDABLE))
 536                         error = aa_mount_change_type(label, path, flags);
 537                 else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
 538                         error = aa_move_mount(label, path, dev_name);
 539                 else
 540                         error = aa_new_mount(label, dev_name, path, type,
 541                                              flags, data);
 542         }
 543         __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 544 
 545         return error;
 546 }
 547 
 548 static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 549 {
 550         struct aa_label *label;
 551         int error = 0;
 552 
 553         label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
 554         if (!unconfined(label))
 555                 error = aa_umount(label, mnt, flags);
 556         __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 557 
 558         return error;
 559 }
 560 
 561 static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
 562                                  const struct path *new_path)
 563 {
 564         struct aa_label *label;
 565         int error = 0;
 566 
 567         label = aa_get_current_label();
 568         if (!unconfined(label))
 569                 error = aa_pivotroot(label, old_path, new_path);
 570         aa_put_label(label);
 571 
 572         return error;
 573 }
 574 
 575 static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 576                                 char **value)
 577 {
 578         int error = -ENOENT;
 579         /* released below */
 580         const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
 581         struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
 582         struct aa_label *label = NULL;
 583 
 584         if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
 585                 label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
 586         else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0  && ctx->previous)
 587                 label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
 588         else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
 589                 label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
 590         else
 591                 error = -EINVAL;
 592 
 593         if (label)
 594                 error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
 595 
 596         aa_put_label(label);
 597         put_cred(cred);
 598 
 599         return error;
 600 }
 601 
 602 static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
 603                                 size_t size)
 604 {
 605         char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
 606         size_t arg_size;
 607         int error;
 608         DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SETPROCATTR);
 609 
 610         if (size == 0)
 611                 return -EINVAL;
 612 
 613         /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
 614         if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
 615                 /* null terminate */
 616                 largs = args = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 617                 if (!args)
 618                         return -ENOMEM;
 619                 memcpy(args, value, size);
 620                 args[size] = '\0';
 621         }
 622 
 623         error = -EINVAL;
 624         args = strim(args);
 625         command = strsep(&args, " ");
 626         if (!args)
 627                 goto out;
 628         args = skip_spaces(args);
 629         if (!*args)
 630                 goto out;
 631 
 632         arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value));
 633         if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
 634                 if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
 635                         error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
 636                                                          AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
 637                 } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
 638                         error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
 639                                                          AA_CHANGE_TEST);
 640                 } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
 641                         error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
 642                 } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
 643                         error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_TEST);
 644                 } else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) {
 645                         error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_STACK);
 646                 } else
 647                         goto fail;
 648         } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
 649                 if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
 650                         error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC);
 651                 else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0)
 652                         error = aa_change_profile(args, (AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC |
 653                                                          AA_CHANGE_STACK));
 654                 else
 655                         goto fail;
 656         } else
 657                 /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
 658                 goto fail;
 659 
 660         if (!error)
 661                 error = size;
 662 out:
 663         kfree(largs);
 664         return error;
 665 
 666 fail:
 667         aad(&sa)->label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
 668         aad(&sa)->info = name;
 669         aad(&sa)->error = error = -EINVAL;
 670         aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
 671         end_current_label_crit_section(aad(&sa)->label);
 672         goto out;
 673 }
 674 
 675 /**
 676  * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
 677  * @bprm: binprm for the exec  (NOT NULL)
 678  */
 679 static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 680 {
 681         struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
 682         struct aa_label *new_label = cred_label(bprm->cred);
 683 
 684         /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
 685         if ((new_label->proxy == label->proxy) ||
 686             (unconfined(new_label)))
 687                 return;
 688 
 689         aa_inherit_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
 690 
 691         current->pdeath_signal = 0;
 692 
 693         /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */
 694         __aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_label);
 695 }
 696 
 697 /**
 698  * apparmor_bprm_committed_cred - do cleanup after new creds committed
 699  * @bprm: binprm for the exec  (NOT NULL)
 700  */
 701 static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 702 {
 703         /* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */
 704         aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current));
 705 
 706         return;
 707 }
 708 
 709 static void apparmor_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 710 {
 711         struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p);
 712         *secid = label->secid;
 713         aa_put_label(label);
 714 }
 715 
 716 static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
 717                 unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 718 {
 719         struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
 720         int error = 0;
 721 
 722         if (!unconfined(label))
 723                 error = aa_task_setrlimit(label, task, resource, new_rlim);
 724         __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 725 
 726         return error;
 727 }
 728 
 729 static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
 730                               int sig, const struct cred *cred)
 731 {
 732         struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
 733         int error;
 734 
 735         if (cred) {
 736                 /*
 737                  * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
 738                  */
 739                 cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
 740                 tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
 741                 error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
 742                 aa_put_label(cl);
 743                 aa_put_label(tl);
 744                 return error;
 745         }
 746 
 747         cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
 748         tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
 749         error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
 750         aa_put_label(tl);
 751         __end_current_label_crit_section(cl);
 752 
 753         return error;
 754 }
 755 
 756 /**
 757  * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
 758  */
 759 static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
 760 {
 761         struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
 762 
 763         ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
 764         if (!ctx)
 765                 return -ENOMEM;
 766 
 767         SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
 768 
 769         return 0;
 770 }
 771 
 772 /**
 773  * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
 774  */
 775 static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 776 {
 777         struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
 778 
 779         SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
 780         aa_put_label(ctx->label);
 781         aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
 782         kfree(ctx);
 783 }
 784 
 785 /**
 786  * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field
 787  */
 788 static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
 789                                        struct sock *newsk)
 790 {
 791         struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
 792         struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
 793 
 794         new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
 795         new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
 796 }
 797 
 798 /**
 799  * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket
 800  */
 801 static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
 802 {
 803         struct aa_label *label;
 804         int error = 0;
 805 
 806         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
 807 
 808         label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
 809         if (!(kern || unconfined(label)))
 810                 error = af_select(family,
 811                                   create_perm(label, family, type, protocol),
 812                                   aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE,
 813                                              family, type, protocol));
 814         end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 815 
 816         return error;
 817 }
 818 
 819 /**
 820  * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct
 821  *
 822  * Note:
 823  * -   kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to
 824  *     move to a special kernel label
 825  * -   socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or
 826  *     sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in
 827  *     sock_graft.
 828  */
 829 static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 830                                        int type, int protocol, int kern)
 831 {
 832         struct aa_label *label;
 833 
 834         if (kern) {
 835                 struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns();
 836 
 837                 label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns));
 838                 aa_put_ns(ns);
 839         } else
 840                 label = aa_get_current_label();
 841 
 842         if (sock->sk) {
 843                 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
 844 
 845                 aa_put_label(ctx->label);
 846                 ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
 847         }
 848         aa_put_label(label);
 849 
 850         return 0;
 851 }
 852 
 853 /**
 854  * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket
 855  */
 856 static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
 857                                 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 858 {
 859         AA_BUG(!sock);
 860         AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
 861         AA_BUG(!address);
 862         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
 863 
 864         return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
 865                          bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen),
 866                          aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk));
 867 }
 868 
 869 /**
 870  * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address
 871  */
 872 static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
 873                                    struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 874 {
 875         AA_BUG(!sock);
 876         AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
 877         AA_BUG(!address);
 878         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
 879 
 880         return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
 881                          connect_perm(sock, address, addrlen),
 882                          aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk));
 883 }
 884 
 885 /**
 886  * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen
 887  */
 888 static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
 889 {
 890         AA_BUG(!sock);
 891         AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
 892         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
 893 
 894         return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
 895                          listen_perm(sock, backlog),
 896                          aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk));
 897 }
 898 
 899 /**
 900  * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection.
 901  *
 902  * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept
 903  *       has not been done.
 904  */
 905 static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
 906 {
 907         AA_BUG(!sock);
 908         AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
 909         AA_BUG(!newsock);
 910         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
 911 
 912         return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
 913                          accept_perm(sock, newsock),
 914                          aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk));
 915 }
 916 
 917 static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
 918                             struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 919 {
 920         AA_BUG(!sock);
 921         AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
 922         AA_BUG(!msg);
 923         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
 924 
 925         return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
 926                          msg_perm(op, request, sock, msg, size),
 927                          aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
 928 }
 929 
 930 /**
 931  * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket
 932  */
 933 static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
 934                                    struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 935 {
 936         return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
 937 }
 938 
 939 /**
 940  * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message
 941  */
 942 static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
 943                                    struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
 944 {
 945         return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size);
 946 }
 947 
 948 /* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */
 949 static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
 950 {
 951         AA_BUG(!sock);
 952         AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
 953         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
 954 
 955         return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
 956                          sock_perm(op, request, sock),
 957                          aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
 958 }
 959 
 960 /**
 961  * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address
 962  */
 963 static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
 964 {
 965         return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
 966 }
 967 
 968 /**
 969  * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address
 970  */
 971 static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
 972 {
 973         return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
 974 }
 975 
 976 /* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */
 977 static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
 978                             int level, int optname)
 979 {
 980         AA_BUG(!sock);
 981         AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
 982         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
 983 
 984         return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
 985                          opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname),
 986                          aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
 987 }
 988 
 989 /**
 990  * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options
 991  */
 992 static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
 993                                       int optname)
 994 {
 995         return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock,
 996                                 level, optname);
 997 }
 998 
 999 /**
1000  * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options
1001  */
1002 static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
1003                                       int optname)
1004 {
1005         return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock,
1006                                 level, optname);
1007 }
1008 
1009 /**
1010  * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn
1011  */
1012 static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
1013 {
1014         return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
1015 }
1016 
1017 #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
1018 /**
1019  * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
1020  *
1021  * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held
1022  *
1023  * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram()
1024  * to deny an incoming connection  socket_sock_rcv_skb()
1025  */
1026 static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
1027 {
1028         struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
1029 
1030         if (!skb->secmark)
1031                 return 0;
1032 
1033         return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE,
1034                                       skb->secmark, sk);
1035 }
1036 #endif
1037 
1038 
1039 static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
1040 {
1041         struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
1042 
1043         if (ctx->peer)
1044                 return ctx->peer;
1045 
1046         return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);
1047 }
1048 
1049 /**
1050  * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer
1051  *
1052  * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
1053  */
1054 static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
1055                                              char __user *optval,
1056                                              int __user *optlen,
1057                                              unsigned int len)
1058 {
1059         char *name;
1060         int slen, error = 0;
1061         struct aa_label *label;
1062         struct aa_label *peer;
1063 
1064         label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
1065         peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk);
1066         if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
1067                 error = PTR_ERR(peer);
1068                 goto done;
1069         }
1070         slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer,
1071                                  FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
1072                                  FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
1073         /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
1074         if (slen < 0) {
1075                 error = -ENOMEM;
1076         } else {
1077                 if (slen > len) {
1078                         error = -ERANGE;
1079                 } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) {
1080                         error = -EFAULT;
1081                         goto out;
1082                 }
1083                 if (put_user(slen, optlen))
1084                         error = -EFAULT;
1085 out:
1086                 kfree(name);
1087 
1088         }
1089 
1090 done:
1091         end_current_label_crit_section(label);
1092 
1093         return error;
1094 }
1095 
1096 /**
1097  * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
1098  * @sock: the peer socket
1099  * @skb: packet data
1100  * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
1101  *
1102  * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
1103  */
1104 static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
1105                                             struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
1106 
1107 {
1108         /* TODO: requires secid support */
1109         return -ENOPROTOOPT;
1110 }
1111 
1112 /**
1113  * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
1114  * @sk: child sock
1115  * @parent: parent socket
1116  *
1117  * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can
1118  *       just set sk security information off of current creating process label
1119  *       Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based
1120  *       instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled
1121  *       socket is shared by different tasks.
1122  */
1123 static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
1124 {
1125         struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
1126 
1127         if (!ctx->label)
1128                 ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
1129 }
1130 
1131 #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
1132 static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1133                                       struct request_sock *req)
1134 {
1135         struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
1136 
1137         if (!skb->secmark)
1138                 return 0;
1139 
1140         return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT,
1141                                       skb->secmark, sk);
1142 }
1143 #endif
1144 
1145 /*
1146  * The cred blob is a pointer to, not an instance of, an aa_task_ctx.
1147  */
1148 struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
1149         .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
1150         .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
1151         .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
1152 };
1153 
1154 static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
1155         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
1156         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
1157         LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
1158         LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
1159 
1160         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
1161         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
1162         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),
1163 
1164         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
1165         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
1166         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
1167         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir),
1168         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir),
1169         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod),
1170         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename),
1171         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod),
1172         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown),
1173         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate),
1174         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),
1175 
1176         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
1177         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, apparmor_file_receive),
1178         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission),
1179         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security),
1180         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security),
1181         LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
1182         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
1183         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
1184 
1185         LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
1186         LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
1187 
1188         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
1189         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
1190         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
1191 
1192         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
1193         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create),
1194         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
1195         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
1196         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
1197         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
1198         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
1199         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
1200         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
1201         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
1202         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
1203         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
1204         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
1205 #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
1206         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
1207 #endif
1208         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
1209                       apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
1210         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
1211                       apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
1212         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
1213 #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
1214         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
1215 #endif
1216 
1217         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
1218         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
1219         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
1220         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer),
1221 
1222         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds),
1223         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
1224         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
1225 
1226         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
1227         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
1228         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, apparmor_task_getsecid),
1229         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
1230         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
1231 
1232 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
1233         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, aa_audit_rule_init),
1234         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, aa_audit_rule_known),
1235         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, aa_audit_rule_match),
1236         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, aa_audit_rule_free),
1237 #endif
1238 
1239         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx),
1240         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid),
1241         LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx),
1242 };
1243 
1244 /*
1245  * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
1246  */
1247 
1248 static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1249 static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1250 #define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
1251 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
1252         .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
1253         .set = param_set_aabool,
1254         .get = param_get_aabool
1255 };
1256 
1257 static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1258 static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1259 #define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
1260 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
1261         .set = param_set_aauint,
1262         .get = param_get_aauint
1263 };
1264 
1265 static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1266 static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1267 #define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
1268 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
1269         .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
1270         .set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
1271         .get = param_get_aalockpolicy
1272 };
1273 
1274 static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1275 static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1276 
1277 static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1278 static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1279 
1280 /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
1281  * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
1282  */
1283 
1284 /* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
1285 enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
1286 module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
1287                   &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1288 
1289 /* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */
1290 bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT);
1291 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
1292 module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1293 #endif
1294 
1295 /* Debug mode */
1296 bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES);
1297 module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1298 
1299 /* Audit mode */
1300 enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
1301 module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
1302                   &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1303 
1304 /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages.  This
1305  * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
1306  */
1307 bool aa_g_audit_header = true;
1308 module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
1309                    S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1310 
1311 /* lock out loading/removal of policy
1312  * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
1313  *       load policy, if lock_policy is set
1314  */
1315 bool aa_g_lock_policy;
1316 module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
1317                    S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1318 
1319 /* Syscall logging mode */
1320 bool aa_g_logsyscall;
1321 module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1322 
1323 /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
1324 unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
1325 module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR);
1326 
1327 /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
1328  * on the loaded policy is done.
1329  * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now
1330  * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy.
1331  */
1332 bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true;
1333 module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);
1334 
1335 static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1336 static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1337 #define param_check_aaintbool param_check_int
1338 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aaintbool = {
1339         .set = param_set_aaintbool,
1340         .get = param_get_aaintbool
1341 };
1342 /* Boot time disable flag */
1343 static int apparmor_enabled __lsm_ro_after_init = 1;
1344 module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aaintbool, 0444);
1345 
1346 static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
1347 {
1348         unsigned long enabled;
1349         int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
1350         if (!error)
1351                 apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
1352         return 1;
1353 }
1354 
1355 __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
1356 
1357 /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
1358 static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1359 {
1360         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1361                 return -EINVAL;
1362         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1363                 return -EPERM;
1364         return param_set_bool(val, kp);
1365 }
1366 
1367 static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1368 {
1369         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1370                 return -EINVAL;
1371         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
1372                 return -EPERM;
1373         return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
1374 }
1375 
1376 static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1377 {
1378         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1379                 return -EINVAL;
1380         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1381                 return -EPERM;
1382         return param_set_bool(val, kp);
1383 }
1384 
1385 static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1386 {
1387         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1388                 return -EINVAL;
1389         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
1390                 return -EPERM;
1391         return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
1392 }
1393 
1394 static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1395 {
1396         int error;
1397 
1398         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1399                 return -EINVAL;
1400         /* file is ro but enforce 2nd line check */
1401         if (apparmor_initialized)
1402                 return -EPERM;
1403 
1404         error = param_set_uint(val, kp);
1405         pr_info("AppArmor: buffer size set to %d bytes\n", aa_g_path_max);
1406 
1407         return error;
1408 }
1409 
1410 static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1411 {
1412         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1413                 return -EINVAL;
1414         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
1415                 return -EPERM;
1416         return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
1417 }
1418 
1419 /* Can only be set before AppArmor is initialized (i.e. on boot cmdline). */
1420 static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1421 {
1422         struct kernel_param kp_local;
1423         bool value;
1424         int error;
1425 
1426         if (apparmor_initialized)
1427                 return -EPERM;
1428 
1429         /* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */
1430         value = !!*((int *)kp->arg);
1431         memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local));
1432         kp_local.arg = &value;
1433 
1434         error = param_set_bool(val, &kp_local);
1435         if (!error)
1436                 *((int *)kp->arg) = *((bool *)kp_local.arg);
1437         return error;
1438 }
1439 
1440 /*
1441  * To avoid changing /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled from Y/N to
1442  * 1/0, this converts the "int that is actually bool" back to bool for
1443  * display in the /sys filesystem, while keeping it "int" for the LSM
1444  * infrastructure.
1445  */
1446 static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1447 {
1448         struct kernel_param kp_local;
1449         bool value;
1450 
1451         /* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */
1452         value = !!*((int *)kp->arg);
1453         memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local));
1454         kp_local.arg = &value;
1455 
1456         return param_get_bool(buffer, &kp_local);
1457 }
1458 
1459 static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1460 {
1461         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1462                 return -EINVAL;
1463         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
1464                 return -EPERM;
1465         return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
1466 }
1467 
1468 static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1469 {
1470         int i;
1471 
1472         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1473                 return -EINVAL;
1474         if (!val)
1475                 return -EINVAL;
1476         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1477                 return -EPERM;
1478 
1479         i = match_string(audit_mode_names, AUDIT_MAX_INDEX, val);
1480         if (i < 0)
1481                 return -EINVAL;
1482 
1483         aa_g_audit = i;
1484         return 0;
1485 }
1486 
1487 static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1488 {
1489         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1490                 return -EINVAL;
1491         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
1492                 return -EPERM;
1493 
1494         return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
1495 }
1496 
1497 static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1498 {
1499         int i;
1500 
1501         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1502                 return -EINVAL;
1503         if (!val)
1504                 return -EINVAL;
1505         if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1506                 return -EPERM;
1507 
1508         i = match_string(aa_profile_mode_names, APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX,
1509                          val);
1510         if (i < 0)
1511                 return -EINVAL;
1512 
1513         aa_g_profile_mode = i;
1514         return 0;
1515 }
1516 
1517 /*
1518  * AppArmor init functions
1519  */
1520 
1521 /**
1522  * set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task.
1523  *
1524  * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
1525  */
1526 static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
1527 {
1528         struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
1529 
1530         set_cred_label(cred, aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns)));
1531 
1532         return 0;
1533 }
1534 
1535 static void destroy_buffers(void)
1536 {
1537         u32 i, j;
1538 
1539         for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
1540                 for_each_cpu_buffer(j) {
1541                         kfree(per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j]);
1542                         per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j] = NULL;
1543                 }
1544         }
1545 }
1546 
1547 static int __init alloc_buffers(void)
1548 {
1549         u32 i, j;
1550 
1551         for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
1552                 for_each_cpu_buffer(j) {
1553                         char *buffer;
1554 
1555                         if (cpu_to_node(i) > num_online_nodes())
1556                                 /* fallback to kmalloc for offline nodes */
1557                                 buffer = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL);
1558                         else
1559                                 buffer = kmalloc_node(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL,
1560                                                       cpu_to_node(i));
1561                         if (!buffer) {
1562                                 destroy_buffers();
1563                                 return -ENOMEM;
1564                         }
1565                         per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j] = buffer;
1566                 }
1567         }
1568 
1569         return 0;
1570 }
1571 
1572 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
1573 static int apparmor_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
1574                              void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
1575 {
1576         if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1577                 return -EPERM;
1578         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1579                 return -EINVAL;
1580 
1581         return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
1582 }
1583 
1584 static struct ctl_path apparmor_sysctl_path[] = {
1585         { .procname = "kernel", },
1586         { }
1587 };
1588 
1589 static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = {
1590         {
1591                 .procname       = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy",
1592                 .data           = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy,
1593                 .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
1594                 .mode           = 0600,
1595                 .proc_handler   = apparmor_dointvec,
1596         },
1597         { }
1598 };
1599 
1600 static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
1601 {
1602         return register_sysctl_paths(apparmor_sysctl_path,
1603                                      apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
1604 }
1605 #else
1606 static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
1607 {
1608         return 0;
1609 }
1610 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
1611 
1612 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
1613 static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
1614                                           struct sk_buff *skb,
1615                                           const struct nf_hook_state *state)
1616 {
1617         struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
1618         struct sock *sk;
1619 
1620         if (!skb->secmark)
1621                 return NF_ACCEPT;
1622 
1623         sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
1624         if (sk == NULL)
1625                 return NF_ACCEPT;
1626 
1627         ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
1628         if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
1629                                     skb->secmark, sk))
1630                 return NF_ACCEPT;
1631 
1632         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
1633 
1634 }
1635 
1636 static unsigned int apparmor_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
1637                                             struct sk_buff *skb,
1638                                             const struct nf_hook_state *state)
1639 {
1640         return apparmor_ip_postroute(priv, skb, state);
1641 }
1642 
1643 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
1644 static unsigned int apparmor_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
1645                                             struct sk_buff *skb,
1646                                             const struct nf_hook_state *state)
1647 {
1648         return apparmor_ip_postroute(priv, skb, state);
1649 }
1650 #endif
1651 
1652 static const struct nf_hook_ops apparmor_nf_ops[] = {
1653         {
1654                 .hook =         apparmor_ipv4_postroute,
1655                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
1656                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
1657                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
1658         },
1659 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
1660         {
1661                 .hook =         apparmor_ipv6_postroute,
1662                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV6,
1663                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
1664                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
1665         },
1666 #endif
1667 };
1668 
1669 static int __net_init apparmor_nf_register(struct net *net)
1670 {
1671         int ret;
1672 
1673         ret = nf_register_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
1674                                     ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
1675         return ret;
1676 }
1677 
1678 static void __net_exit apparmor_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
1679 {
1680         nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
1681                                 ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
1682 }
1683 
1684 static struct pernet_operations apparmor_net_ops = {
1685         .init = apparmor_nf_register,
1686         .exit = apparmor_nf_unregister,
1687 };
1688 
1689 static int __init apparmor_nf_ip_init(void)
1690 {
1691         int err;
1692 
1693         if (!apparmor_enabled)
1694                 return 0;
1695 
1696         err = register_pernet_subsys(&apparmor_net_ops);
1697         if (err)
1698                 panic("Apparmor: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
1699 
1700         return 0;
1701 }
1702 __initcall(apparmor_nf_ip_init);
1703 #endif
1704 
1705 static int __init apparmor_init(void)
1706 {
1707         int error;
1708 
1709         aa_secids_init();
1710 
1711         error = aa_setup_dfa_engine();
1712         if (error) {
1713                 AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n");
1714                 goto alloc_out;
1715         }
1716 
1717         error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
1718         if (error) {
1719                 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
1720                 goto alloc_out;
1721         }
1722 
1723         error = apparmor_init_sysctl();
1724         if (error) {
1725                 AA_ERROR("Unable to register sysctls\n");
1726                 goto alloc_out;
1727 
1728         }
1729 
1730         error = alloc_buffers();
1731         if (error) {
1732                 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n");
1733                 goto buffers_out;
1734         }
1735 
1736         error = set_init_ctx();
1737         if (error) {
1738                 AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
1739                 aa_free_root_ns();
1740                 goto buffers_out;
1741         }
1742         security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
1743                                 "apparmor");
1744 
1745         /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
1746         apparmor_initialized = 1;
1747         if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
1748                 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
1749         else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
1750                 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
1751         else
1752                 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
1753 
1754         return error;
1755 
1756 buffers_out:
1757         destroy_buffers();
1758 
1759 alloc_out:
1760         aa_destroy_aafs();
1761         aa_teardown_dfa_engine();
1762 
1763         apparmor_enabled = false;
1764         return error;
1765 }
1766 
1767 DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
1768         .name = "apparmor",
1769         .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
1770         .enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
1771         .blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
1772         .init = apparmor_init,
1773 };
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root/security/apparmor/lsm.c

DEFINITIONS
